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ABSTRACT
The two dimensions of the state in transition under the 
influence of globalization are changes in the welfare state and 
changes in the nation-state. And both dimensions of the state 
are closely linked to higher education, especially to its elite 
segment, the institution of the university: which — in Europe — 
has been mostly state-funded as part of the well-developed post­
war Keynesian welfare state apparatus, and which has been 
closely related to the modern construct of the nation-state. We 
are developing here the theme of the modern contract between 
the nation-state and the university and trying to see how the 
processes of globalization — via affecting the state — affect the 
public sector in general, and public universities in particular. 
Global pressures on both institutions are discussed, following a 
historical detour showing the modern link between them. The 
discussion of the global transformations of the public sector is 
then followed by tentative conclusions.
1. INTRODUCTION
It is the overall argument of the present paper that current 
transformations to the state under the pressures of globalization are 
transforming the modern institution of the university, and consequently 
it is useful to discuss its future tasks and mission in the context of the 
current global transformations of the state. At the same time, the 
legitimacy of, and loyalty towards, modern liberal democratic welfare 
states is under severe stress today and the whole idea of a (European) 
postwar “social contract” between the state and its citizens is widely 
debated. It has been argued that modern states came to be nation-states 
because they triumphed in war, were (relatively) successful 
economically and won legitimacy in the eyes of their populations and 
other states (Held 1995). The sovereignty of the state meant also the 
sovereignty of national educational policies and guaranteed state 
support for nation-state oriented universities (from the times of their
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inception as modern institutions bound by a “pact” with modern 
nation-states since the beginning of the 19"' century). The university 
used to provide the modern nation-state with “a moral and spiritual 
basis” and professors, as Gerard Delanty argues in Challenging 
Knowledge along Humboldtian lines, “constructed themselves as the 
representatives of the nation” (Delanty 2001, pp. 33-34).
National education systems were created as part of the state 
forming process which established the modern nation-state. They were 
born when states based on absolutistic or monarchical rule gave way to 
the modern nation-state: as Andy Green stresses in his Education, 
Globalization, and the Nation-State, the history of “national education” 
is thus very much the history of the “nation state in formation” (Green 
1997, p. 131). National education systems contributed to the creation of 
civic loyalties and national identities and became guardians for national 
languages, cultures, literatures and consciousness. The modern 
university and the modern nation-state went hand in hand, or were 
parts of the same wide process of the European modernization. 
Consequently, as we claim here, reconfigurations of the modern nation­
state today are bound to affect the modern institution of the university. 
State-sponsored mass education is, in modernity, the primary source of 
socialization facing the individual as citizen of a nation-state (see 
Spybey 1996). Individuals were given access to “knowledge” and the 
opportunity of becoming “educated” — “but enablement is combined 
with constraint upon the individual to identify with and participate in 
the state as a national project” (Spybey 1996, p. 59). European nation­
states were engaged in authorizing, funding and managing education 
systems, including higher education, to construct unified national 
polities. And the idea that a military defeat (or a failure to keep pace 
with industrial development in rival countries) is a factor stimulating 
the state to turn to (higher) education as a means of national 
revitalization can be referred directly to the Humboldtian reforms (see 
Kwiek 2006a, pp. 99-115).
In sociological and educational terms, the issue of the “idea” of 
the university, following its outliving of “modern” forms, is still open. 
Let us be very cautious, at the same time, while discussing the 
relationship between education and the state under global pressures. In 
different parts of the world the education-state relationship has 
traditionally had different forms; its current transformations, 
consequently, may go in different directions, despite the influence of 
powerful homogenizing factors. Thus we need to be very cautious in our 
analyses and very provisional in our conclusions. It is interesting to note 
that in those countries having a similar position of education vis-a-vis 
the state, and those standing at a roughly similar level of economic 
development, national debates about the transformations of the welfare 
state (and the restructuring of the public sector) seem to be playing to
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the same tune (European post-communist transition countries seem to 
follow quite closely the global patterns of reforming higher education 
and the public sector in general, already discussed but actually not 
really implemented in the major Western EU countries).
2. THE MODERN UNIVERSITY AND THE MODERN NATION­
STATE
The crucial step in the historical development of European 
universities for our purposes here is what Guy Neave termed the process 
of their nationalization -  bringing the university formally into the public 
domain as a national responsibility. With the rise of the nation-state, 
the university was set at the apex of institutions defining national 
identity: “the forging of the nation-state went hand in hand with the 
incorporation of academia into the ranks of state service, thereby 
placing upon it the implicit obligation of service to the national 
community” (Neave 2001, p. 26; a wider version of this line of argument 
is presented in Kwiek 2005 and 2006a, pp. 139-226).
The emergence of the Prussian and French (Napoleonic) models 
of the university did not only mean the shift from revealed knowledge — 
characteristic of Medieval universities — to verifiable scientific 
knowledge. These institutions were also illustrating the process of “the 
harnessing of the university to the modernization of society” (Neave 
2000b, p. 5). The Humboldtian reforms and their French counterparts 
are also
a crucial step in the definition of the Nation-State itself, by 
putting in place those institutions for upholding national identity, 
providing the means of perpetuating particular ‘knowledge 
traditions’ to which the emergent Nation attaches importance as 
unique expressions of its exceptionalism, and formalizing the type 
of knowledge necessary both for citizenship and for assuming the 
highest administrative responsibilities the Nation may confer 
(Neave 2000b, p. 5).
The emergence of the universities in Berlin and in Paris marked 
the termination of the long process for the incorporation of the 
university to the state (Neave 2001, p. 25).
The process of the “nationalization” of the university settled the 
issue of what the role and responsibilities of the modern institution in 
society should be. The emergent nation-state defined the social place of 
the emergent modern university and determined its social 
responsibilities. The nation-state determined the community to which 
the university would be answerable: it was going to be the national
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community, the nation. The services and benefits the unitary and 
homogeneous nation-state gradually, and over the passage of time, 
placed at the disposal of society went far beyond education and 
included e.g. generous healthcare systems and old-age pension 
schemes.1
The idea of what constituted “useful knowledge” was being 
renegotiated in the course of the history of the modern university. With 
the advent of the nation-state, useful knowledge assumed a new form: it 
was the type of knowledge which “underpinned national cohesion, 
provided techniques, skills and understanding to ensure the 
administration of public order, health and the maintenance of the rule 
of law”. The university became “the prime source of such knowledge and 
the repository of the Nation’s historic, cultural and political memory, 
the preservation and diffusion of which was its paramount task” (Neave 
2000b, p. 12). The production of this type of knowledge at the university 
became its public responsibility. At the same time, though, as Neave 
stresses, there was the other obligation of the institution: the second 
duty, conceived of under the influence of German Idealists in the form 
of the pursuit o f  truth.1 It was disinterested scholarship driven by the 
curiosity of free individuals, scholars searching for truth.
While Neave in his papers stresses that aspect of the Humboldtian 
— and German Idealists’ generally — interpretation of the university in 
which “culture, science and learning existed over and above the state” 
and in which “the responsibility of the university was to act as the 
highest expression of cultural unity” (Neave 2001, p. 25, emphases 
mine), I would like to stress the national aspect of Bildung and the role 
of the university as conceived by the German thinkers in the production 
of national consciousness, providing the national glue to keep citizens 
together, fostering national loyalty and supporting not only the 
nationhood in cultural terms but also the nation-state in political 
terms/
Following detailed readings of Wilhelm von Humboldt, Friedrich 
Schleiermacher, Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Friedrich W. J. Schelling 
(see Kwiek 2006a, pp. 81-138, 2006b, pp. 2-44), we are inclined to stress 
the combination of cultural and political motifs in their formulations of 
the idea of the university rather than (following Neave) merely cultural 
ones; perhaps even the political cum cultural motif. The classical 
German notion of Bildung from that period, and from the writings of 
these philosophers, to a varying degree depending on the exact 
historical moment and a given author, is certainly very strongly 
politicized. It refers to the cultivation of the self and of the individual 
but also to the cultivation of the individual as a  nation-state citizen.
The tension between “the pursuit of truth” and “public 
responsibility” in the evolution of the modern university, Neave stresses, 
has been very clear in German writings on Academia. The dichotomy is
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clearly present in the founding fathers of the German university as well. 
There is a clear tension between thinking about science and the 
community of scholars and students, truth and universality on the one 
hand, and the national consciousness, nationhood, the state and 
academic responsibilities to them on the other.
Increasingly, at the beginning of the 19th century, culture in the 
sense of Bildung became mixed with political motivations and 
aspirations, focused around the notion of the German national state. It 
is interesting to note that in a global age, both motifs have been put 
under enormous pressure. Forging national identity, serving as a 
repository of the nation’s historical, scientific or literary achievements, 
inculcating national consciousness and loyalty to fellow-citizens of the 
nation-state do not serve as the rationale for the existence of the 
institution of the university any more; but also the production of a 
“disciplined and reliable workforce” is not fulfilling the demands of the 
new global economy which requires workers with the capacity to learn 
quickly and to work in teams in reliable and creative ways — Robert B. 
Reich’s “symbolic analysts” — as Raymond A. Morrow and Carlos 
Alberto Torres emphasize (Morrow and Torres 2000, p. 33). But at the 
same time, the disinterested pursuit of truth by curiosity-driven 
scholars in the traditional sense of the term is no longer accepted as a 
raison d ’etre for the institution either (see Kwiek 2004a, and 2004b on 
the Bologna Process). Consequently, no matter whether we focus more 
on the cultural unity of the nation or on the political unity of the nation 
as the two distinct driving forces behind the development of the modern 
university, both motifs are dead and gone in post-national and global 
conditions. Neither serving truth, nor serving the nation (and the 
nation-state) can be the guiding principles for the functioning of the 
institution today, and neither of them are even mentioned in current 
debates on a global or European level (it is sufficient to read the 
communications of the European Commission about the role of the 
university and research and development activities in knowledge-based 
societies or World Bank’s and OECD’s views on the future role of the 
university which are underpinning reforms of higher education in most 
transition and developing countries today, see European Commission 
2003, World Bank 2002, OECD 1998).4
The move towards the “nationalization” of the university was 
strong and the process of linking the university to the national state 
continued throughout the 19'1' century (as one commentator remarked, 
“the universalization of the nation-state went hand in hand with the 
‘nationalization’ of culture”, Axtmann 2004, p. 260). The social purpose, 
missions and roles of the university in the emergent national state were 
redefined anew. Emergent higher education systems were clearly 
national systems, with their own national priorities and distinctive 
patterns of validation and certification of knowledge and education.
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Civil service in the nation-state was closely linked with national 
universities and at the same time scholars (especially full professors) — 
in some countries — gained the status of public servants. The 
“nationalization” of higher education was inseparable from the 
“nationalization” of scholars: the introduction of the civil service status 
for senior academics served also “to impress firmly upon the 
consciousness of academia its role as an emanation of the national 
wisdom and genius, creativity and interest” (Neave 2001, p. 30).
The process of the “nationalization” of the university so vividly 
described by Neave has come to a close right now, together with the 
advent of globalization. I am in full agreement with the three 
implications of globalization for the institution of the university which 
Neave draws. First, globalization brings to a close the process of the 
incorporation of the university into the service of the state; second, 
globalization redefines the place of the university in society -  from “an 
instrument for political integration” to “part of the ‘productive 
process’”, a driver of economic integration between nations; and third, it 
is the corporation that becomes “the basic organizational paradigm for 
the university” (Neave 2000b, pp. 16-17) or “society’s central referential 
institution” (Neave 2001, p. 48).
There is also an increasing awareness of the artificiality, or at 
least of the constructed nature, of nation-state citizenship. As Mike 
Bottery argues, it is only at the present time that “the political body 
defining the terms and boundaries of citizenship is something called 
‘the nation-state’” (Bottery 2003, p. 102). Bottery stresses that nation­
state citizenship involves a form of exchange, even if such an exchange 
is rarely fully articulated. In return for a transfer of identification and 
loyalty from the local and regional level to that of the nation-state, 
nation-states have provided its citizens with civil citizenship (the right 
to freedom of speech, rights to justice and the ownership of property), 
political citizenship (the right to be involved in the exercise of political 
power) and social citizenship (the right to healthcare and economic 
security, and educational provision) (Bottery 2003, p. 103ff). What is of 
major interest to us here is the social citizenship. The loyalty of citizens 
of nation-states is closely related to this “bilateral” agreement, although 
never fully codified, between citizens and the state. Should the nation­
state be threatened, so also will its role as primary guarantor of 
citizenship rights. The social concept of citizenship has been under 
attack since the 1970s and critiques have come from three directions; a 
philosophical aversion to the paternalistic state; a pragmatic belief in 
the declining capacity of the nation state to provide social goods 
(healthcare, social security, education) adequately; and a belief in its 
inferior capability of providing these goods in comparison with the 
market:
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All of these bear upon the status and legitimacy of the nation­
state, and therefore upon the citizenship bargain, for if the state 
is seen as an essentially malevolent entity, needing to be kept as 
small as possible and having neither the capacity nor the 
capability of providing the goods it has claimed to provide, what 
right has it to demand allegiance, loyalty and duty from the 
individual? Why should individuals provide these when it does 
so little for them? (Bottery 2003, p. 105).
The philosophical aspect of this critique of social citizenship (or 
of the welfare state in particular) came from von Hayek’s The Road to 
Serfdom  and Milton Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom. The threat to 
social citizenship under global pressures comes from what C. Lash has 
called the “revolt of the elites”: the wealthy cease to identify themselves 
with any particular nation state. The citizens-consumers may opt out of 
the political life of nation-states and shop around for the best low-cost 
citizenship, in the most profitable or least-taxed locations around the 
globe. Internationally mobile groups may be much less willing to 
cooperate with others in resolving local problems — as Dani Rodrik 
argues, “owners of internationally mobile factories become disengaged 
from their local communities and disinterested in their development 
and prosperity”, if faced locally by both bad economies and bad 
governance (Rodrik 1997, p. 70). The forces undermining the loyalty of 
citizens of nation-states are varied and also include, apart from the 
critique of social citizenship and consumerism, political globalization, 
economic globalization and the new ideas of “mean and lean” states. It 
is very unclear indeed why — together with the possible dismantling of 
the welfare state and the end of the postwar “social contract” between 
governments, unions and workers, the decline in the capacities, 
capabilities and willingness of nation-states to provide some 
traditionally (sometimes even fully) state-funded welfare services, 
together with many other factors mentioned here — that national 
loyalty should not be decreasing? And if it is decreasing anyway, for 
some structural reasons, why the whole modern paradigm of the close 
link between higher education (civic, national education) and the 
nation-state should be as strong as in pre-globalization eras?
3. THE UNIVERSITY AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR: GLOBAL 
TRENDS
Globalization exerts enormous pressures on both the 
functioning of public sectors, as well as the very thinking about their 
functioning; at the same time, higher education clearly loses, with a 
different speed in different countries and regions, its unique character
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as part of the public sector’; it has to compete with other segments of 
the sector for (generally increasingly competitive ) public funds. The 
competition is fierce and its results cannot be predicted; in this zero- 
sum game the other competitors for public funds are primary and 
secondary education, pension schemes for the aged, health care, low 
income and unemployment entitlements and benefits, prisons, police, 
the military etc; to an extent, the result of the competition depends also 
on the social perception of what higher education is about today, how it 
serves society and how it should be funded; it depends also on the 
answer to the question of which benefits it is able to provide for the 
individual — public or private, individual and collective etc, and which 
are viewed as more significant today.6 Consequently, the link between 
the public sector and the institution of the university is as strong as 
never before — but all public sector institutions have been under fire (or 
under scrutiny, in more neutral parlance) in recent years (see Kwiek 
2001).
Globalization seems to be changing the role of the nation-state: 
the nation state is gradually losing its power as a direct economic player 
and at the same time it is losing a significant part of its legitimacy as it 
appears not to be willing, or able, to provide the welfare services seen as 
the very foundation of the postwar welfare state.' Nation-states seem to 
prefer not to use the financial space of maneuver still left to them, even 
if they could be much more pro-active than reactive with respect to the 
impact of globalization on public services, including higher education.’' 
As William Melody argues,
rising government deficits and declining average real incomes 
have forced governments to assess critically the performance 
and resource claims of virtually all institutions associated with 
the welfare state. As a major public institution, the university 
has been asked to justify its public service performance, its 
demands for public resources, and the efficiency of its 
management of these resources. For most universities this was 
the first time they had been asked for a comprehensive 
accounting as public institutions (Melody 1998, p. 75)
Universities -  especially in Continental Europe -  were mostly 
not able to respond to requests for more accountability. They have 
attempted to justify themselves in terms of the traditional Humboldtian 
notion of the university: academic freedom and institutional autonomy, 
disinterested and curiosity-driven research, the idea of a unique social 
institution founded on the basis of the community of students and 
scholars etc. But in essence, as Melody argues, the replies universities 
gave in response to a general request for the justification of their social 
role boiled down to the following: the university should not be held
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accountable by anyone other than itself. Consequently, the university’s 
arguments have been viewed by the government and business (the main 
providers of funding in Europe) as self-serving.
One way that globalization has had a major impact on 
education has been through what Martin Carnoy termed “finance- 
driven reforms” (as opposed to “competitiveness-driven reforms” and 
“equity-driven reforms”, see Carnoy 1999, p. 42ff) the main goal of which 
is to reduce public spending on education. As he argues in Globalization 
and Educational Reform: What Planners Need to Know, the former set of 
reforms may contribute to the shortage of public resources for 
education “even when more resources could be made available to 
education with net gains for economic growth” (Carnoy 1999, p. 52).
It is important to remember that linking economic and social 
change to changes in how societies transmit knowledge, as Martin 
Carnoy and Diana Rhoten argue, is a relatively new approach to 
studying education (Carnoy and Rhoten 2002, p. 1). Before the 1950s, 
comparative education focused mainly on the philosophical and 
cultural origins of educational systems: educational change was seen as 
resulting from changing educational philosophies. In the 1960s and 
1970s this view was challenged by various historical studies in which 
educational reform was situated in economic and social contexts. 
Today, they claim, it is the phenomenon of globalization that is 
providing a new empirical challenge and a new theoretical framework 
for rethinking higher education:
One point is fairly clear. If knowledge is fundamental to 
globalization, globalization should also have a profound impact 
on the transmission of knowledge (Carnoy and Rhoten 2002, p. 
2).
And the impact of globalization on the transmission of 
knowledge is the impact on, inter alia, education and educational 
institutions, especially at the higher level.9 Carnoy argues elsewhere 
(Carnoy 1999, p. 14) that although education appears to have changed 
little at the classroom level, globalization is having a “profound effect” 
on education at other levels. But at the heart of the relationship between 
globalization and education is the “relationship between the globalized 
political economy and the nation-state” (Carnoy and Rhoten 2002, p. 
3)."’ To the question whether the power of the nation is diminished by 
globalization, Carnoy answers in the positive and in the negative. Both 
answers are important but the argumentation behind the positive 
answer is crucial for our purposes here. So in his view globalization 
diminishes the power of the nation-state because global economic 
competition makes the nation state focus on “economic policies that 
improve global competitiveness, at the expense of policies that stabilize
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the current configuration of the domestic economy or possibly social 
cohesion” (Carnoy 1999, p. 20, all emphases mine).
This major shift of concern by today’s states is towards 
economic and global concerns at the expense of social and domestic 
ones, which makes the state completely different from what Bob Jessop 
called once “The Keynesian National Welfare State” (Jessop 1999, p. 
348). What it may mean in practice is a shift in public spending and 
monetary policy: from measures favoring workers and consumers to 
those favoring financial interests. Or as Carnoy and Rhoten put it, 
“globalization forces nation-states to focus more on acting as economic 
growth promoters for their national economies than as protectors of the 
national identity or a nationalist project” (Carnoy and Rhoten 2002, p. 3)
Consequently, the role of universities seems quite different from 
these two perspectives: the traditional (modern, national) perspective 
saw universities as useful instruments for inculcating national identity 
and the new (post-national, global) one sees universities as (equally 
useful) instruments in promoting economic growth and boosting 
national economies. At the same time, the debate on the university 
today comes as part and parcel of a much wider debate on the public 
sector (and state intervention in, or provision of, different, traditionally 
public, services). Certainly in the period of the traditional Keynesian 
welfare state regimes it was the state — rather than the market — that 
was deeply involved in the economy and in the protection of nation­
state citizens against the potential social evils of postwar capitalism. As 
the World Bank’s flagship publication on the role of the state argues, for 
much of the 20,h century people looked to government or the state to do 
more; but since the 1980s, the pendulum has been swinging again, and 
the existing conceptions of the state’s place in the world have been 
challenged by such developments as e.g. the collapse of command-and- 
control economies or the fiscal crisis of the welfare state. Consequently, 
today, the countries are asking again what government’s role ought to 
be and how its roles should be played (World Bank 1997, p. 17). The 
state’s behavior and the consequences of that behavior are under severe 
scrutiny worldwide (as is the whole post-war paradigm of the Keynesian 
welfare state).
In the developing countries, the retreat of the state in such 
social areas as health care, education or housing has had detrimental 
effects (United Nations 2001, p. 32). The report stresses the point that 
while in Western Europe privatization, deregulation, de­
bureaucratization and decentralization have been carefully coordinated 
with the goals of the welfare state, and much energy has been spent on 
reconciling the acquired social structure and social benefits with the 
new age of “permanent austerity” (Pierson 2001), in the developing 
countries (in the 1980s) and in Central and Eastern Europe (in the 
1990s) neo-liberal strategies brought about quite different
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consequences. As the report describes the process from a historical 
perspective, “in barely two decades, the ‘reinvention’ movement and 
NPM [New Public Management] have set the tone and content of the 
discourse in administration and government in ways that sharply 
contrast with the course of its development during the major part of the 
20th century. The proponents of these tenets were able to carry their 
message literally throughout the world” (United Nations 2001, p. 53).u 
Even though their criticism concerned bureaucracy, in the last analysis 
it affected government intervention — as implemented e.g. through the 
public sector institutions — as seen in the Keynesian economics and the 
New Deal ideology.’ Markets and states should be seen as 
complementary forces — and the role of an “intelligent, democratic 
state” is to provide, through rules and institutions, an “enabling 
framework” for private sector development and economic growth 
(United Nations 2001, p. 68).
How is the public funding of education and education spending 
(as part of social expenditure within the welfare state undergoing 
restructuring) to be seen as an investment rather than a cost? 
Paradoxically, the unwillingness or inability of the state to increase the 
level of public funding for higher education (or in more general terms, to 
use Philip G. Cerny’s expression, the decreased state’s potential for 
“collective action”, 1995) is accompanied by a clear realization that — in 
the new global era — higher education is more important for social and 
economic development than ever before (see Kwiek on one of cost-side 
solutions to the revenue problem of universities — academic 
entrepreneurship, Kwiek 2008a, 2008b). The United Nations’ report 
argues that countries that want to benefit from globalization must 
invest in education, to upgrade their citizens’ skills and knowledge 
(United Nations 2001, p. 84). Martin Carnoy (as part of his UNESCO 
explanation of “what planners need to know” about restructuring higher 
education under global pressures) concludes that what is needed is a 
coherent and systemic effort by the public sector — which “usually 
means more, as well as more effective, public spending” (Carnoy 1999, p. 
86).
4. CONCLUSIONS
There is thus an interesting tension between what most education 
sector specialists and academics dealing with higher education issues 
say about the future of the university and what political economists, 
political scientists or sociologists say about the future of the state, as 
well as the welfare state and its services in particular, including higher 
education. There is no easy way out of this apparent paradox. Perhaps 
this is one of those cracks in the otherwise seamless fabric of
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globalization accounts regarding the future role of higher education in 
which some future, unexpected shifts in the relations between the state 
and the university may take place. We have moved a long way from the 
relationship between the modern nation-state and the modern 
university described by Andy Green (with respect to education as such, 
not merely higher education) in the following manner:
National education was a massive engine of integration, 
assimilating the local to the national and the particular to the 
general. In short, it created, or tried to create, the civic identity 
and national consciousness which would bind each to the state 
and reconcile each to the other.... Education was the pre­
eminent author and guardian of this national identity and 
culture (Green 1997, p. 134).
All or almost all above assumptions no longer hold. Where 
higher education is heading under the new pressures on the nation­
state (and the welfare state) — and especially why — is a critical issue to 
be debated within academe.
NOTES
1. There are two contrasting positions taken with respect to the 
impact of globalization upon the welfare state: globalization as 
the fundamental factor behind the retreat of the welfare state, 
and globalization as a significant but not critical factor. There 
seems to be no major disagreement about the future of the 
(European) welfare state in its current postwar form : its 
foundations, for a variety of internal and external reasons and 
due to a variety of international and domestic pressures, need to 
be renegotiated today. Major differences between welfare 
scholars are based on different explanations about what has 
been happening to the European welfare state since mid-1970s, 
about different variations of restructuring in different European 
countries, and different degrees of emphasis concerning the 
scope of welfare state renegotiation in particular countries in 
the future. Globalization and the welfare state is the issue that 
most sharply divides current researchers on welfare issues — 
and the future of the welfare state is crucial for the future of the 
institution of the (public) university today. The social 
phenomena of greatest interest to me in the present paper in 
more general terms—such as the recommodification of society, 
the desocialization of the economy, the denationalization of 
both societies and economies, the deterritorialization and
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despatialization of economic activities, the changing 
distribution of risks in society, the growing individualization of 
society, the growing market orientation in thinking about the 
state and public services, the disempowerment of the nation­
state, the transnationalization of welfare spending patterns, the 
detraditionalization of nationhood and citizenship—all 
influence the way welfare issues are perceived, how problems 
are seen as problems and how solutions accepted as solutions. 
And these processes are at least intensified by globalization.
2. There are three main principles of the modern university to be 
found in German thinkers, the founding fathers of the 
University of Berlin. The first principle is the unity of research 
and teaching (die Einheit von Forschung and Lehre); the second 
is the protection of academic freedom: the freedom to teach 
(Lehrfreiheit) and the freedom to learn (Lernfreiheit); and the 
third is the central importance of the faculty of philosophy (the 
faculty of Arts and Sciences in modern terminology) (see Fallon 
1980: 28ff; Rohrs 1995: 24ff). The three principles are developed, 
to varying degrees, in Schelling, Fichte, Schleiermacher and 
Humboldt. Together, the three principles have guided the 
modern institution of the university through the 19"’ century to 
the 20"' century, and possibly beyond. To what extent these 
principles are being questioned today, by whom and in what 
segments of the diversified systems of higher education is a 
different issue. Very briefly, and without the necessary nuancing 
of the answer, the principle of the unity of teaching and research 
still guides the functioning of our universities, but not so much 
our higher education sector in general; academic freedom is 
under severe attack in both developed and developing countries, 
from a variety of directions, including threats from the state and 
business sectors, perhaps especially from transnational 
corporations in selected areas; and the third principle, the 
centrality of philosophy to the functioning of the university, 
seems to be the most endangered, if not already abandoned, 
both in theory and in practice.
3. It is interesting to refer to the traditional apologia of the role of 
the nation (and, in a complementary and unavoidable manner, 
nationalisms) in apparently post-national contemporary 
societies as vigorously presented by Anthony D. Smith in his 
Nations and Nationalism in a  Global Era (1995). In a concluding 
chapter, “In Defence of the Nation”, Smith argues that “the 
nation and nationalism provide the only realistic socio-cultural 
fram ew ork fo r  a modern world order. They have no rivals today. 
National identity too remains widely attractive and effective 
and is felt by many people to satisfy their needs for cultural
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fulfillment, rootedness, security and fraternity.... [GJlobal 
culture seems unable to offer the qualities of collective faith, 
dignity and hope that only a ‘religion surrogate’, with its 
promise of a territorial culture-community across the 
generations, can provide” (Smith 1995, p. 159, emphasis mine). 
Considering the (still) fundamentally uneven distribution of the 
benefits and the ills of globalization, and the geographical 
concentration of its impact in selected parts of the globe, from a 
global perspective (without privileging the social and economic 
developments of most affluent parts of the world), Smith may be 
right. He may be right for millions of people from the world 
unaffected by global pressures but may be wrong for millions of 
others e.g. Europeans, especially in the context of the emergent 
European “post-national” community. The point of view of 
(Zygmunt Bauman’s) “globals” is certainly different from that of 
“locals” (see Bauman 1998), as the lifestyles and loyalties of 
(Leslie Sklair’s) “transnational capitalist class” differ from those 
of nationally-rooted, immobile, traditional workers (see Sklair 
2001). The lack of any national rootedness of (Bobert B. Reich’s) 
“symbolic analysts” is a serious threat to national cohesion but, 
from a global perspective, only in some locations (see Reich 
1992).
4. For international organizations, “globalization” has become a 
key concept “with which to interpret the enormous economic, 
political and cultural changes that characterize human society 
at the beginning of the 2T‘ century” (Henry et al. 2001, p. 19). It 
does not change its heuristic usefulness but it does serve as a 
point of reference in discussions between academics and 
policymakers. There are certainly other broad descriptions 
which could be used equally well such as, say, post-Fordism, 
postindustrialism, informa-tionalism, post-national, late 
modernity, liquid modernity, “post-work society”, “risk society” 
rather than “work society”, “knowledge society” rather than 
“industry and service society” etc. but it looks like the term 
globalization in its current usage captures them all.
5. It has been especially phenomena like “new managerialism” 
implemented throughout Anglo-Saxon countries across the 
entire public sector that has had such a substantial impact on 
higher education. I have to agree with Miriam Henry and 
colleagues in their book on the OECD, globalization and higher 
education policy when they argue that “education systems have 
lost their sui generis character. Organisation, structures and 
basic practices look similar in education, health, welfare and 
other public sector bureaucracies” (Henry et al. 2001, p. 33).
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As Harold A. Hovey put it penetratingly, “the underlying 
question about spending will be whether, at the margin, higher 
education spending is contributing more than spending at the 
margin in other programs” (Hovey 1999, p. 17). Current 
reformulations of the social tasks of the welfare state are 
happening at a time when the traditional responsibilities of the 
state are under revision — as Hovey rightly stresses, “certain 
activities now viewed as part of baselines could be defined as 
outside the traditional responsibilities of government” (Hovey 
1999, p. 60). Higher education has to compete successfully with 
other socially attractive forms of state spending.
The three leading European social scientists: Jürgen Habermas, 
Ulrich Beck, and Zygmunt Bauman view the social future of 
Europe from a wider perspective and provide additional 
arguments, through their rethinking of the welfare state, for the 
present author’s point that the transformation of public higher 
education on a global scale is unavoidable. Habermas, Beck and 
Bauman, despite coming from different philosophical and 
sociological traditions, agree on one point: the transformations 
of the welfare state we are currently witnessing are irreversible, 
we are passing into a new age with respect to the balance 
between the economic and the social. With respect to welfare 
futures, the emergence of Habermas’ “postnational 
constellation” carries the same message as the emergence of 
Beck’s “second, postnational modernity” and Bauman’s “liquid 
modernity”: the traditional postwar Keynesian welfare state, 
with its powerful “nation-state” component, is doomed, and for 
the three thinkers the culprit behind the end of this social 
project in Europe is globalization, in its theories and its 
practices. None of them focuses on the internal developments of 
the European welfare state (like changing demographics, 
including the aging of Western societies; shifts in familial 
structures; the burden of past entitlements within the inter- 
generational contract between the old and the young, the 
working and the unemployed etc.); they clearly link the new 
geography of social risks and uncertainties with the advent of — 
mainly economic — globalization.
Arguments provided by Geoffrey Garrett in such papers as 
“Global Markets and National Politics” (2000b), or “The Causes 
of Globalization” (2000a) and “Globalization and the Welfare 
State” which he co-authored with Deborah Mitchell (1999) — 
about the public provision of collective goods that are 
undersupplied by markets and valued by players who are 
interested in productivity (“ranging from the accumulation of 
human and physical capital, to social stability under conditions
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of high market stability, to popular support for the market 
economy itself”, Garrett 2000b, p. 313) — could certainly be 
used as arguments in favor of the public financial support for 
higher education. It would be interesting to see to what extent 
Garrett’s view that “the financial markets are essentially 
disinterested in the size and scope of government. Their 
primary concern is whether the government balances its books” 
(2000b, p. 314) is correct with e.g. postcommunist transition 
countries. My perception is that in the current ideological 
climate, it is much more than merely the books; it is also the 
direction of the transformations to the public sector. At the 
same time Garrett’s “domestic compensation” traditionally 
coupled with (economic) “openness”, referring directly to Karl 
Polanyi, does not have to necessarily mean higher education as 
a part of the public sector in the Keynesian welfare state. It 
might be that even if Garrett is right in his thinking about the 
real (rather than rhetorical) changes to Western welfare state 
regimes, the conclusions may not pertain to education which 
might no longer be seen as a collective good, which does not 
seem to be undersupplied by the market and which has not been 
a protective, conflict-mitigating measure against the market­
generated conflicts (but still part of a public sector). Still 
another issue is whether high redistributive taxation remains 
possible and whether its future is related only to globalization.
9. On top of that, we are beginning to feel at universities the full 
effects of the universalization of higher education and the 
increasing commodification of research. For the project of the 
European integration, the theme of the new “Europe of 
Knowledge” seems crucial; the emergent European educational 
and research space becomes a significant component of the 
“revitalization” of the Europeanization project. The foundations 
of the European knowledge society (and knowledge economy) 
are constructed around such pivotal notions as “knowledge”, 
“innovation”, “research”, “education” and “training”. Education, 
and especially “lifelong learning”, becomes a new discursive 
space in which European dreams of common citizenship are 
currently being located. A new “knowledge-based Europe” is 
becoming individualized (individual learners rather than 
citizens of nation-states) and the construction of a new 
educational space can contribute to forging a new sense of 
European identity. It is possible that the idea of Europe and its 
founding myths and symbols are being redefined; making this 
new education space (being constructed through the emergent 
European educational and research policies discussed in the 
present chapter), in which a new European identity is being
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forged, crucial in discussing transformations of European higher 
education systems today (see Kwiek 2004b).
10. 1 am in full agreement with Anthony R. Welch when he argues 
that “it is becoming increasingly difficult to understand 
education without reference to such [i.e. globalization] 
processes” (Welch 2001, p. 478).
11. What is at stake is instilling a new set of values, an indirect 
influence over the nation-state — which is much more effective 
as a strategy in changing national policies than explicit threats 
of punitive sanctions, as Nicholas C. Burbules and Carlos 
Alberto Torres argue (Burbules and Torres 2000, p. 9).
12. As Manuel Castells comments, “the privatization of public 
agencies and the demise of the welfare state, while alleviating 
societies from some bureaucratic burdens, worsen considerably 
living conditions for the majority of citizens, break the historical 
contract between capital, labor, and the state, and remove much 
of the social safety net, the nuts and bolts of legitimate 
government for common people” (Castells 1997, p. 354, 
emphasis mine).
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